Game theory has been successfully applied in biology as a method for studying evolution. However, biologists approached game theory in a different way as economists have done. In the introduction to his influential book, John Maynard Smith (1982) states the differences between evolutionary game theory -the application of game theory to biology-and the traditional economic approach to game theory. In evolutionary game theory the payoffs of a game are identified with Darwinian fitness, and rationality is replaced with evolutionary stability. The basic object of study is a population of individuals competing with each other for survival and reproduction. This strategic competition is modeled through a game and the strategies correspond to the phenotypes whose survival is in question. The aim is to study the evolution of the different strategies in the population. In an evolutionary game, however, individuals do not consciously choose, but are programmed to play certain strategies. More successful strategies survive with higher probability and reproduce faster. A strategy is said to be evolutionarily stable if, once adopted by all members of the population, a small fraction of so-called mutants -i. e. individuals doing something different-will be selected against. Intuitively, if several strategies are present in a stable situation, they all must be equally successful. In a large population, a stable situation must correspond to a Nash equilibrium. In this way, evolutionary game theory provides foundations for the concept of Nash equilibrium and a different interpretation. Moreover, this interpretation is absent of the rationality assumptions of traditional game theory.
Definition 1. We say that x is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for all y = x, there exists some ∈ (0, 1), which may depend on y, such that for all ∈ (0, ) u(x, y + (1 − )x) > u(y, y + (1 − )x).
That is, x is ESS if, after mutation, non-mutants are more successful than mutants, in which case mutants cannot invade and will eventually get extinct. We refer to as the invasion barrier -the maximum rate of mutants against which x is resistant. Note that the concept of ESS, like the concept of NE, is static -once reached, it is stable. We will study evolutionary dynamics in the next chapter.
If we rewrite expression (8) as u(x, y) + (1 − )u(x, x) > u(y, y) + (1 − )u(y, x), it is easy to see that (8) is equivalent to u(x, x) ≥ u(y, x) ∀y,
u (x, x) = u(y, x) ⇒ u(x, y) > u(y, y) 
For x to be an ESS, condition (9) requires that non-mutants fare against themselves at least as well as mutants do. Otherwise, in a population consisting mainly of non-mutants, mutants will thrive, while non-mutants will get extinct. If both fare equally well, x can only be stable if it has additional advantages. This is what condition (10) requires. Namely that non-mutants fare against mutants better than mutants fare against themselves. Otherwise, mutants would have the same reproductive success as non-mutants after every encounter with non-mutants, and they would reproduce faster than non-mutants after every encounter with mutants. Condition (9) corresponds to the definition of NE. It shows that if x is an ESS, then it must constitute a symmetric NE. Thus, evolutionary stability implies Nash. However, condition (10) requires that an ESS be more than a NE. Therefore, not all symmetric NE are ESS. Moreover, if x constitutes a strict, symmetric NE (i. e. u(x, x) > u(y, x) ∀y = x), then condition (10) never applies and x is immediately ESS.
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES

Examples
Example 9. Prisoner's dilemma. Recall the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game that we introduced in Example 5. In this game each player has two strategies, cooperate (C) and defect (D), where D strictly dominates C. Therefore, in equilibrium both players choose D. This NE is symmetric and strict -choosing D is always the only best reply. Thus, D is also the only ESS. This example demonstrates that evolutionary stability does not necessarily imply optimality. In the PD game both players would be better off if they both played C. Example 10. Coordination game. Recall the coordination game introduced in Example 7 with payoff matrix
This game has three symmetric NE, namely {e 1 , e 2 ,x} withx = (1/3, 2/3). The pure-strategy equilibria are strict. Therefore, they are ESS. This in another example showing that evolutionary stability does not imply optimality. Note that equilibrium e 2 is better for both players than equilibrium e 1 . However, e 1 is also ESS. The third equilibriumx is not ESS. To see this, suppose that exactly 1/3 of the population is playing the first strategy. Then, the average payoff in the population isx·Ax = 8/3, and both pure strategies earn payoff 8/3 on average. Suppose now that a small group of mutants playing the first strategy enters the population. Both, mutants and non-mutants, who are randomly matched to non-mutants, get payoff 8/3 on average. However, mutants who are randomly matched to mutants get payoff 2, while non-mutants who are randomly matched to mutants get only payoffx · Ae 1 = 2/3 < 2 on average. Example 11. Hawk-Dove game. Recall the Hawk-Dove game introduced in Example 6, where two individuals compete for a resource (food, or territory) that relatively increases the fitness of the individual that gets it by ν. Individuals can behave either as hawks or as doves. Hawks fight for the resource until they get injured or until the opponent retreats. Doves do not fight for the resource and they retreat as soon as they meet a hawk. When two hawks meet, they fight until one of them gets injured, and the loser's fitness is reduced by c. It is assumed that c > ν > 0. If two hawks or two doves meet, each gets the resource with probability 1/2. The payoff matrix is given by
Let x 1 be the fraction of hawks in the population. Then the average fitness of hawks is x 1 ( ν−c 2 ) + (1 − x 1 )ν and that of doves is (1−x 1 ) ν 2 . If the population consists mostly of doves (i. e. x 1 is close to cero), hawks typically meet doves, win the resource, and they prosper. If the population consists mostly of hawks (i. e. x 1 close to one), hawks typically meet hawks, they get frequently injured and loose fitness, while doves do not fight, do not get injured, and thrive relative to hawks. Both strategies are equally successful when the fraction of hawks in the population is exactlyx 1 = ν c . The profilex = (x 1 , 1 −x 1 ) corresponds to the only symmetric NE of the game.
5 Thus, it is the only candidate to be an ESS. Since both, hawks and doves, have the same fitness when the population profile isx, forx to be an ESS, we must additionally check condition (10), i. e. that for all y =x,x · Ay > y · Ay. It is straightforward to check that for any y = (y 1 , 1 − y 1 ) with y 1 =x 1
Example 12. Reconsider the Rock-scissors-paper game introduced in Example 8 with payoff matrix
The only NE of the game is a symmetric one where each strategy is played with probability 1/3,x = (
. Since it is a mixed-strategy equilibrium, it is not strict. We need to check condition (10) to see ifx is an ESS. Suppose that the population profile isx and that a small group of mutants enters the population, all playing e 1 . Non-mutants who are matched with mutants get on averagexAe 1 = 1, and mutants who are randomly matched with other mutants also get payoff 1. Thus, the population profilex is not evolutionarily stable since a small group of mutants playing for example e 1 would survive. 5 The game has also two asymmetric NE in pure strategies. Proof. Let x be an ESS, and let C(y) ⊂ C(x) for y = x. Since x constitutes a NE, then u(s, x) = u(x, x) for all s ∈ C(x). It follows that u(y, x) = u(x, x). Condition (10) implies that u(x, y) > u(y, y). Thus, y cannot constitute a NE. This additionally implies that a completely mixed ESS must be unique, since no pure strategy can constitute a symmetric NE, and no other mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a strict subset of pure strategies can constitute a symmetric NE. Therefore, they can also not be ESS. An example of this is the hawk-dove game in Example 11. Note also that a game with a pure ESS cannot have a completely mixed ESS, since the former cannot be in the support of the latter. An example of this is the coordination game of Example 10.
Proposition 2. If x ∈ ∆ is an ESS, then it constitutes a perfect NE.
Proof. Recall that, for two-player games, a NE is perfect if and only if no weakly dominated strategy is played with positive probability. Since ESS implies NE, it is enough to show that an ESS cannot assign positive weight to a weakly dominated strategy.
Suppose x ∈ ∆ is an ESS (and thus also NE) and that it assigns positive weight to a weakly dominated pure strategy. Then x itself is weakly dominated. Let y ∈ ∆ be a strategy that dominates x.
Then for all z ∈ ∆, u(y, z) ≥ u(x, z). In particular, taking z = x we have u(y, x) ≥ u(x, x). Since x constitutes a NE, u(y, x) = u(x, x). Taking z = y, u(y, y) ≥ u(x, y), which contradicts condition (10), and the fact that x is ESS.
Multipopulation models
In order to analyze asymmetric contexts like the one of the entry deterrence (ED) game introduced in Examples 1-4, we would need to extend the definition of an ESS to such asymmetric situations. In the ED game entrant and incumbent do not have the same payoff matrix. We need to consider two populations, one of potential entrant firms and one of incumbent firms. In general, for an n-player game, we will have n populations.
Let I = {1, . . . , n} the set of players. Assume there is a large population of individuals in each player position. Call S i the set of pure strategies available to individuals of population i ∈ I, and ∆ i the set of possible population profiles within population i (formally equivalent to the set of mixed strategies). Let Θ = × i∈I ∆ i be the set of all possible multipopulation profiles. Definition 2. We say that x ∈ Θ is evolutionarily stable if for all y = x there exists ∈ (0, 1), which may depend on y, such that for all ∈ (0, )
Proposition 3. x ∈ Θ is evolutionarily stable if and only if x is a strict NE.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ Θ is evolutionarily stable. Fix i ∈ I. For player i, let y i be any strategy different to x i . For all j = i let y j = x j . Then y = x. Define z = y + (1 − )x with ∈ (0, ), where is the invasion barrier for y.
, which means that x is a strict NE. Suppose now that x is a strict NE. Let y = x. Then y i = x i for some i, and
which is equivalent to (11). Remark 2. Note that in the entry deterrence game the only evolutionarily stable profile is the one corresponding to the strict NE where the entrant enters and the incumbent yields. 
THE REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
In the last section we defined the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and showed that evolutionary stability implies (perfect) Nash. However, ESS is a static concept -a strategy such that, if already adopted by all individuals in the population, will be resistant to any small fraction of mutants playing otherwise. In the present section, we explicitly introduce natural selection forces over time. In the same analytical framework as in the last section, we consider individuals from a large population who are randomly drawn in pairs to play a two-player game over and over again. Each individual is programmed to play a pure strategy -the replicatorwhich will be inherited by all her offspring. The first question is how the distribution over pure strategies in the population changes over time according to some dynamic selection process. In particular, we will focus on the basic evolutionary dynamics known as the replicator dynamics (RD). The second question is whether the distribution of pure strategies converges to some profile in the long run, and if so, whether this profile corresponds to a Nash equilibrium (NE). We will see that, indeed, long-run aggregate behavior corresponds to NE. This provides dynamic foundations for the concept of NE. Even if agents in a large population are not rational and do not have coordinated beliefs, in the aggregate the population behaves as if each individual fulfilled all the rationality assumptions.
The replicator equation
Consider the analytical framework described in Section 3.1. Let t ∈ [0, ∞) denote continuous time. Each vector x(t) = (x 1 (t), . . . , x k (t)), x(t) ∈ ∆ -called population state-corresponds to the shares of individuals in the population playing each pure strategy i ∈ S at any instant t, although we will drop the time index whenever this does not lead to confusion. We will put up a model to analyze how these proportions x i change over time.
Assume that the population is very large but finite. Let p i (t) ≥ 0 be the number of individuals in the population who display pure strategy i at time t. Let p(t) = j∈S p j (t) > 0 be the total size of the population at t. Then x i (t) = p i (t)/p(t) ≥ 0. Given the population profile x, recall that u(e i , x) denotes the average payoff of any pure strategy i, and that the average payoff in the population is given by u(x, x) = j∈S x j u(e j , x). Here we interpret u(e i , x) as the increment in the average number of offspring per unit of time with respect to some basic birthrate β ≥ 0.
6 We assume that all individuals reproduce in one unit of time and that they die after reproduction at some rate δ ≥ 0. Each offspring replicates the pure strategy adopted by its single parent. Therefore, the number of individuals that will display strategy i at t + 1 will be 7 p i (t + 1) = [β + u(e i , x(t) 
The standard way to approximate such a discrete-time equation by its continuous-time counterpart is to postulate that agents reproduce (and potentially die) uniformly along any single period, so that in any time interval of length 0 < h < 1 a fraction h of the population reproduces. That is,
Rearranging we obtain
x(t)) − δ]p i (t)
Taking limits when h → 0,ṗ
where the upper dot denotes time derivativeṗ i (t) = d dt p i (t). Note thaṫ
p(t) = [β + u(x(t), x(t)) − δ]p(t)
From equations (12)- (14) the replicator equations follow.
